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Abstract
In the Norwegian electricity system, new
consumption patterns and changing load profiles
increase an already apparent need for reinvestment in
the aging network infrastructure. This is very costly,
and network operators consider alternative ways of
increasing capacity, which are less costly and more
flexible. One such option is end-user flexibility. In the
paper, we give an overview of the Norwegian
electricity market and regulation and the potential of
end-user flexibility. We present an investment case
provided by a network company, which illustrates that
the choice of compensation method to customers have
a large impact on the cost and/or revenue cap in the
regulatory model. By issuing direct payments for
flexibility services, end-user flexibility results in a
lower efficiency, although the revenue cap may be
higher, while redistribution of network tariffs have a
marginal effect on efficiency and the revenue cap.
Through redistribution of network tariffs, the network
operator can defer investments without a notable
change in the revenue cap or change in efficiency. This
highlights some of the future challenges that the
regulator faces in setting a regulatory framework for
end-user flexibility and it challenges the vertical
separation that has been a corner stone in the
deregulated electricity market.

1. Introduction
The unique physical properties of electricity define
how electricity systems are designed. Since supply and
demand must be perfectly balanced at all times,
changes in demand must be matched by a similar
change in supply. Furthermore, the electricity system is
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built to be a redundant network. To ensure a reliable
electricity supply and a sufficient safeguard against
loss of power, network operators determine
investments based on the hours of peak load in a year.
This often results in significant investments in network
capacity to ensure that reliability and safety standards
are met. Thus, optimizing investment decisions
through smarter electricity system solutions is highly
prioritized by Norwegian network operators.
The global trends of electrification, decentralization
and digitalization increase the focus on finding
innovative ways of planning and upgrading the
electricity system infrastructure. The trends introduce a
plethora of new solutions to the network operator. To
ensure a secure and stable supply of electricity,
exploiting flexible resources and capabilities in the
electricity system is highlighted as a promising way
forward. However, utilizing flexible capacities in the
electricity system is not a new concept. With a tight
relationship between supply and demand, flexible
generation and production has been implemented by
large generators and producers at the transmission level
of the Norwegian electricity systems for several years.
Since technological advances mainly occur at the
distribution level of the electricity system, there is a
large, untapped potential in utilizing flexibility at the
end-user level. This type of end-user flexibility can be
used to shift consumption in periods of peak-load,
mitigating the need for costly investments in network
infrastructure.
With an increasing share of decentralized energy
production, Europe´s highest EV penetration rate and
an aging and mature infrastructure, new and costefficient ways of securing sufficient capacity is a
priority. On the other hand, the Norwegian electricity
system is well equipped for the challenges of the
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future. With 98% of all electricity production coming
from flexible and renewable hydro power energy,
mature and multinational markets with satisfying
liquidity in the day-ahead, intra-day and real time
market and power tariffs being introduced by 2021,
Norway could get a head start in terms of smart
electricity infrastructure management compared to the
rest of Europe.
In this paper, we discuss the design of the
Norwegian electricity market, and how end-user
flexibility can be of value in the Norwegian electricity
system. We provide an overview over different
benefits and applications of end-user flexibility
described in the literature. By means of a case study,
we discuss how Norwegian network operators can
utilize end-user flexibility to defer investments in
network infrastructure. It is clear that the way the
DSOs can compensate end-users have a large effect on
the profitability of using end-user flexibility. This is
due to the incentive model in the regulation of the
network monopolies, and illustrates that the vertical
separation that has been a corner stone of the
deregulation of the electricity market so far, may be
challenged by the developments of smart grid solutions
and more active consumers in the local grids.

2. Vertical separation in the Norwegian
electricity system
To ensure a reliable, safe and cost-efficient supply
of electricity, responsibilities and tasks are assigned to
different participants in the electricity system. The
responsibility of the Transmission System Operator
(TSO) is to ensure operation and development of the
transmission network, and to control frequency. In
Norway, there is only one TSO, Statnett. The
Distribution System Operators (DSOs) own and
operate the distribution networks within different
regions, and are responsible for supplying end-users
with electricity. There are 105 DSOs in Norway. The
TSO and DSOs are responsible for transporting
electricity and controlling overload and voltage. In
Norway, entering a contract with a DSO is mandatory
for consumers in order to receive electricity.
Consumers are not free to choose the DSO, as
operators have monopoly within their respective
regions. The monopoly situation for DSOs and the
TSO is a result of the deregulation process that
occurred in the early 90s.
However, a competitive market exists for the
purchase and sale of electricity. Consumers are free to
choose which retailer to buy their electricity from.
When providing electricity to end-users, the retailer
purchases electricity from generators at the Power

Exchange (PX), or by off-exchange trading through
bilateral contracts. The producers and DSOs pay the
TSO for being connected to and using the transmission
network, whilst consumers pay to the DSOs.
Norwegian power generation is dominated by
hydro power (> 95 %), although recently, there has
been an increase in renewable generation, especially
wind power. Total storage capacity is about 70 % of
the Norwegian demand.

2.1. The wholesale market
The current market regime consists of several
wholesale market places. The trading in the different
markets is mostly in a sequential manner, determined
by how close to real-time operation one trades. The
main part of the wholesale market is the day-ahead
market operated by Nord Pool and Euphemia, the latter
representing the joint European market place. In this
market, buyers and sellers submit their bid curves for
every single hour in the following day. The power
exchange finds the prices that match demand
(purchase) and supply (sales) hour by hour. Because of
intermittent production and unplanned outages,
participants can also trade in the intraday market to
ensure balance. As opposed to the day-ahead market,
which is cleared simultaneously for all hours of the
day, the intraday market is cleared continuously. The
bids and corresponding commitments are aggregated at
zonal levels in both markets.
The bids from the day-ahead and intraday markets
have an hourly resolution that ensures market balance
in the planning phase. However, to ensure real time
balance, the TSO organizes reserve markets with
different time horizons. The reserves are primarily
dispatchable, large generators that increase or decrease
generation to stabilize the frequency. The market
participants calculate and report deviations between
planned and metered sale and purchase, after each
single operational hour. The economic consequences of
any imbalances are settled by the TSO in accordance to
imbalance prices. Both the day-ahead, intraday and
reserves market share the common objective of
ensuring balance between generation and load in the
most efficient way.

2.2. The end-user market
Most consumers purchase their electricity from a
retailer. The terms are specified through a supply
contract between each consumer and a freely chosen
retailer. The retailer takes part in the wholesale market
and is responsible for assuring balance on behalf of
their group of consumers. This part of the market is
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denoted as the end-user side or demand side of the
market. Contracts with fixed or variable prices are
most common for consumers with periodically metered
consumption. Variable price contracts usually have a
fixed price for a period, for example based on the area
prices (usually monthly prices). Another contract
follows the market price from the day-ahead market.
Since prices vary hourly, the aggregated consumption
for a consumer in a period is distributed, in accordance
to a pre-defined profile, to calculate an average price
per kWh. Larger consumers with hourly meters can
have contracts that settles according to hourly
consumption and corresponding hourly market prices.
Changes in consumption metering are currently being
undertaken by the industry.
Network contracts with the local DSO have a
different contract structure. These contracts mainly
cover the DSOs expenses related to operation,
maintenance and reinforcement of the distribution
network. In addition to covering costs, the contracts
aim to distribute expenses fairly among the network
consumers.

2.3. Incentive based regulation of distribution
grids
To promote efficient energy markets and costeffective energy systems, a revenue cap regulation was
introduced by NVE in 1997. The revenue cap
regulation is part of the regulation on economic and
technical reporting, revenue cap for network operators
and tariffs (Olje- og Energidepartementet, 2017). The
revenue cap should cover the network operator’s costs
and give a reasonable return on assets under the
assumption of efficient operation, reasonable
maintenance and network development. When
calculating a company’s cost-efficiency, the regulator
uses Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) for the
benchmarking (NVE, 2017e).
The revenue cap for the forthcoming year is
notified by NVE in November the year in advance, and
network operators set their tariffs accordingly. All data,
results and calculations are published to ensure
transparency and understanding of the methodology.
The Revenue cap for each company is calculated from
the actual total costs two years back, adjusted for
inflation and price changes, and a cost norm, using the
yardstick formula:
RCt = (1-ρ)Ct + ρCt*
where RCt is the revenue cap for period t, Ct is the
company's cost, and Ct* is the cost norm calculated
from the benchmarking. ρ is the weight of the cost
norm, and in Norway, ρ is presently equal to 0.6. The

size of ρ reflects the strength of the efficiency
incentives in the regulation model (Amundsveen and
Kvile, 2015).
The total cost includes operation and maintenance
costs (OPEX), capital expenses (CAPEX) consisting of
linear depreciations on book values and interest based
on the regulated rate of return, that the regulator (NVE)
sets every year. Moreover, the cost includes losses in
MWh priced at the system price from the electricity
market (Nord Pool), and finally a quality element,
KILE, which is a calculation of the value of lost load
(VOLL). Figure 1 shows the total cost of 119
distribution companies in 2016.
The cost norm, Ct*, is calculated in three steps: the
DEA, a regression analysis to consider geographical
differences and a final calibration. The DEA-model
used by NVE is an input oriented model with a CRS
assumption (Bjørndal et al., 2010). By identifying the
most efficient companies, the DEA finds the
companies that provide services using the least amount
of resources. These companies form the efficiency
frontier, and are denoted as reference companies. In the
current model for distribution networks, the resources
are represented by total costs. The tasks performed by
the company are represented by output variables on
kilometers of high voltage power lines, number of
customers and number of network stations.

Figure 1. Cost for distribution companies
In the second step, the results of the DEA are
adjusted for differences in their operational framework,
to provide a more just comparison of the companies.
The results are adjusted for differences in topography,
climate and network structures using regression
analyses.
In the third and final step of the benchmarking
exercise, the DEA-results are calibrated such that the
average company becomes 100 % efficient. This will
give the average network operator a reasonable return
on assets, and it ensures that, over time, age differences
are taken into consideration. The calibration is

Page 3562

necessary to give network operators incentives to
invest in new assets. Adding up the DEA-norm for the
entire industry from step 2 and then subtracting it from
the total industry cost, gives the total revenue that is
added to companies' revenues. In 2018, this number
was approximately 1.5 billion NOK (NVE, 2017g), i.e.
a considerable amount. The added revenue is
distributed according to the company’s regulatory asset
base divided by the industry's total regulatory asset
base. The larger the added revenue, the greater is the
incentive to increase assets through investments.

2.4. Grid tariffs
The allowed revenue of a distribution company is
collected from the customers, using the principle of
two- or multi-part tariffs, i.e. a variable fee to cover
marginal cost, and one or more residual parts to make
up for the total allowed revenue. The Norwegian
system operates with network contracts made up by
multiple tariffs, dependent on the consumer’s method
of metering. Most households currently have periodical
meters, and their payments consist of two parts: an
energy fee and a fixed fee. The energy fee is usually a
semi-fixed price per kWh multiplied with metered
consumption, whilst the fixed fee can be determined
based on the size of the main fuse. For some
consumers, especially the larger ones, there could be
an additional fee based on peak power usage in a
period. This fee is known as a power charge, and is
usually made up by a fixed price per kWh/h per month.

3. Grid investment needs and alternatives
to grid
In Reiten et al. (2014), four key drivers for
estimating future investment needs in the Norwegian
electricity system was identified. The first is the
technical state of current infrastructure. Substantial
network investments occurred in the 1970 and 1980s,
and parts of the current infrastructure is approaching
the end of its technical lifetime. Ensuring that the
overall state of the electricity system is able to handle
future electricity demand, load profiles and new
appliances is important. Thus, substantial investments
are needed at all network levels in the years to come.
The second driver identified was population
growth, urbanization and increased electricity demand.
A growing population increases electricity demand,
thus resulting in a need for new network infrastructure
to respond to this increase in demand. Furthermore,
population growth rates are higher in urban areas and
large cities, meaning that the DSOs in these areas will

have higher investment needs than the ones in more
remote areas.
A third driver for investments in the electricity
system is compliance with national- and international
climate goals through increased use of new energy
carriers. Although the Norwegian electricity system
has benefitted from flexible hydropower, the increased
use of renewable power generation challenges the
electricity system. Prosumers that sell their energy
back to the network will also increase the complexity
of the electricity system, highlighting the need for
investments.
The fourth and last driver that was highlighted was
connected to load increase predictions. The
electrification of the transport sector, new power
demanding home appliances and the introduction of
automatic metering all affect the future load demand,
and challenge the network in several ways. The
electrification of the transport sector is a critical
challenge for the current Norwegian electricity system.
Historically, combustion engines and fossil fuels have
been used in vehicles, leading to an electricity system
that was not dimensioned for a full electrification of
this sector. Areas in close proximity to transport
centers such as harbors, train- and bus stations will
experience increases in power demand with the
electrification of the transport sector. This leads to a
substantial investment need for capacity increasing
investments at the distribution and regional network
level.
In addition to these key drivers, the general
advances in technology have led to discussions of a
“smarter network”, where end-user flexibility and
flexibility from the demand side is a key component.
By involving the end-user through a third-party
flexibility aggregator, network operators can access
flexibility volumes that are currently hard to obtain for
the specific hours when capacity is needed. Since
changing consumption patterns challenge the network
capacity, flexible end-users can help alleviate peaks
and balance demand and supply.
In conclusion, during the period from 2016 to 2025,
NVE has estimated investment costs of 33 billion NOK
and 15 billion NOK in the high-voltage and lowvoltage parts of the Norwegian distribution network
respectively (NVE, 2016). Since investments at the
distribution level of the electricity system traditionally
has been based on the specific hour in a calendar year
where the power output and consumption is estimated
to be at its highest, load increase predictions play a
vital part in the investment decision network operators
undertake. By utilizing end-user flexibility and smarter
investment solutions, network operators aim to
optimize their network performance while reducing the
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overall investment costs in new infrastructure through
better peak load management.
As a consequence, grid companies are looking for
alternatives to grid investments in general, including
end-user flexibility and new tariffs, but also assessing
the effects of a large increase in the number of
prosumers, storage capacity and microgrids. THEMA
Consulting (2015) made a scenario analysis
highlighting the potential uncertainty in Norwegian
investment needs, depending on the proliferation of the
aforementioned developments. The future use of local
grids may imply increased (more rush-hour customers
due to electric vehicles and other household
appliances) or reduced (end-user flexibility and
prosumers) maximum load, more variation in capacity
utilization (the grid as a back-up solution) and shorter
periods of use.

4. End-user flexibility – an overview of
mechanisms, benefits and applications
End-user flexibility can be defined as the enduser’s ability and capacity to shift, curtail or limit
consumption for short or long periods of time. This
may be the result of market prices, price incentives in
networks tariffs or other mechanisms, potentially not
involving economic incentives. Thus, end-user
flexibility is a concept that includes a diverse set of
dimensions (see also Oren (2013) and Ottesen (2017).

4.1. Implicit and explicit end-user flexibility
A common distinction used in the literature is
between implicit and explicit end-user flexibility.
While implicit end-user flexibility implies that the endusers adjust their consumption patterns according to
price signals, explicit end-user flexibility is
characterized by incentivizing end-users to trade their
flexibility in an organized market place (Ramos et al.,
2013).
Implicit end-user flexibility is often referred to as
price-based flexibility, and implies that end-users
adjust their consumption to price signals or track
variations in price through apps or appliances.
Common price signals are time based power tariffs
such as Time-of-Use (ToU) and Real Time Pricing
(RTP), or demand based power tariffs such as Critical
Peak Pricing (CPP), which raises the price of
electricity when the peak demand is high (EG3, 2015).
An example of an appliance that helps end-users adjust
their consumption is the application SmartLiv by the
Norwegian DSO Ringeriks-Kraft Nett. The application
enables end-users to observe their consumption
through hourly metering, track shifts in consumption

patterns over time and compare their consumption with
neighbors and other end-users (Ringeriks-Kraft Nett
AS, 2017). Another vital aspect of implicit end-user
flexibility deployment is a high time granularity of
metering.
Explicit end-user flexibility embodies flexibility
that can be traded in a market place. With explicit enduser flexibility, the end-user can be compensated
through a contract that enables manual or automatic
shifts in their electricity consumption. One of the key
drivers for the deployment of explicit end-user
flexibility is well-defined and liquid flexibility
markets. Since participation in such markets include
substantial transaction costs, and since volumes
produced from a change in consumption from a single
end-user typically does not satisfy the required bid
size, a key driver in explicit end-user flexibility
deployment is the establishment of aggregators who
aggregate flexibility and offer specific flexibility
services to the market on behalf of the customer.
The main goal of flexibility services is to enable the
end-user to take part in the market place and reduce
their electricity costs by offering flexibility to the
system through their consumption patterns. In this
respect, flexibility services play a vital role in
balancing supply and demand in the electricity system.
Ultimately, increased end-user flexibility can result in
lower electricity prices, which even benefits nonflexible end-users (U.S. Department of Energy, 2017).
Both technology and end-user preferences
influence end-user flexibility deployment. Specific
flexibility services can only be provided by explicit
end-user flexibility, while other services are only
possible with implicit end-user flexibility. Explicit enduser flexibility is a measurable resource. Hence, it can
be incorporated in system adequacy assessments in a
similar way to generation (SEDC, 2016). Implicit enduser flexibility shifts the commitment to the end user’s
behavioral patterns. With the roll out of automatic
meters and increasing customer participation implicit
end-user flexibility may have a large untapped
potential.
Flexibility from large industrial players is actively
used by the TSO to balance the electrical networks. For
imbalances in the distribution network, there is a lack
of measures to adjust production or consumption.
However, intelligent equipment in the networks may
make it possible to utilize end-user flexibility from
smaller electricity consumers, such as households and
offices. The DSOs may acquire flexibility services
both implicitly, from designing appropriate tariffs, and
explicitly, by buying flexibility services.
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4.2. Handling Peak Demand with End-User
Flexibility.
In recent years, end-user flexibility is promoted as a
promising way to deal with new load profiles, an
increasing share of renewable energy sources and a
changing energy demand landscape (Papaefthymiou,
Grave, & Dragoon, 2014). When assessing how to
handle peak demand through end-user flexibility
deployment in the distribution network, large volumes
of end-user flexibility have been hard to obtain for
research and modelling purposes. Researchers at ETH
Zürich (Geidl, et al., 2007) solved this by studying the
interrelation between electrical and thermal energy
systems in buildings called Energy Hubs. These
Energy Hubs relied on various energy input variables
such as electricity, natural gas and heating.
Furthermore, the Energy Hubs included storage and
conversion properties, and produced output services
that complied with certain loads such as electricity,
heating and cooling.
Bozchalui et al., (2012) propose a Mixed Integer
Linear Programming (MILP) optimization problem to
the Energy Hub concept. The problem minimizes
energy consumption, cost of energy, emissions and
peak load. Specific end-user preferences and comfort
levels are also taken into account. The application of
the model on a household in Ontario, Canada resulted
in up to 20% savings on energy costs and a 50%
reduction in peak demand, all while satisfying the
designated preferences and comfort levels of the enduser.
Strbac et al., (2008) discuss the major benefits and
challenges of end-user flexibility in the UK power
system. Key benefits include improved management of
the demand-supply balance in electricity systems with
an increasing share of renewable energy, deferring new
infrastructure
investments,
simplifying
outage
management and relieving congestion in distribution
substations. The use of demand response to better
utilize infrastructure capacity is proposed as a large
benefit. Strbac highlights the lack of ICT systems to
support demand response and end-user flexibility
deployment, immature and insufficient market design
as well as lacking provision of incentives from
OFGEM, the UK regulator.

4.3. End-User
Decisions.

Flexibility

in

Investment

The traditional approach to expanding capacity in
the network is investing directly in physical
infrastructure. Hoff, Wenger and Farmer (1996)
highlights that demand-driven investments in increased

capacity often results in a period of excess capacity.
Furthermore, the cost benefit of deferring investments
results from the specific investment costs and time they
are deferred (Wang, et al., 2008). In an early study,
Román, Gómez, Muñoz, & Peco (1999) proposes the
use of geographic information systems (GIS) to model
and plan network investments alongside roads and
transport infrastructure. They conclude that this
approach reduced barriers and infeasibilities in
network planning.
El Khattam, Hegazy & Salama (2005) proposes a
new model for network investments where the
positioning and sizing of distributed generation (DG)
sources are optimized. Several investment alternatives
are tested, including expanding an existing substation
and adding new feeders to purchasing power from an
existing intertie to meet load demand growth. They
conclude that optimizing this positioning and sizing
can result in a 20% reduction in investment costs.
Méndez et al., (2006) also studies the impact of DG
on deferring distribution network investments. A main
result from their research is that with 0% penetration of
DG, load increases in the distribution network can
grow by 171.4 % until reaching an overload probability
of 0.5%, while a 30% penetration of DG allows a load
increase of 196.4% until reaching an overload
probability of 0.5%. They also highlight that DG plants
with solar PV generation allow higher load growths
before making network reinvestments than DG plants
with wind power generation. This is due to a higher
randomness in wind energy production.
Piccolo & Siano (2009) discusses how DG can
serve as an alternative distribution planning option by
providing opportunities to capture the deferment
benefit. They highlight the regulatory side of the issue
and conclude that European legislations must be
revised to make DG a feasible option to investments in
infrastructure. By obliging network operators to require
for local power generation as a direct alternative to
network infrastructure reinvestments, the deferral
benefits of DG can be reaped.
Pudjianto et al., (2013) introduces smart control to
minimize distribution network reinforcements. They
simulate how network infrastructure investments
differs in a business-as-usual scenario and a Smart
Grid scenario. Without smart infrastructure
management, they estimate that between 2010 and
2050, the total distribution network reinforcements in
the UK will amount to £36 billion. By applying smart
charging of vehicles, smart heat pumps and optimized
control of network voltage regulators, they conclude
that there is a substantial savings potential in
infrastructure investment costs. The report does not
explicitly estimate any savings.
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Spiliotis, Ramos and Belmans (2016) analyze how
end-user flexibility can be used to solve capacity
problems and defer physical network expansions in the
distribution network. They develop and define the
FlexMart model, which enables the DSO to purchase
end-user flexibility offered by residential end-users.
The model works as a long-term planning tool and
provide an optimal combination of physical
expansions, flexibility deployment and dispatch to
reassure capacity needs in network operations are met.

4.4. Quantifying the Technical Potential of
End-User Flexibility.
The technical potential can be described as the
amount of flexibility end-users can offer to the
electricity system. Several research projects have
studied and quantified the flexibility potential in
Norway and the Nordic region.
An early study conducted by Meland et al., in 2006,
estimated the technical potential of end-user flexibility
by considering electricity volumes that could be
replaced by other energy carriers. This study focused
on office buildings, residential homes and industrial
complexes. The flexible load is estimated partly by
assuming plausible changes in energy carriers and by
assuming an average time of 2000 hours each year.
The study concluded that by switching energy carriers,
2700 to 4000 MW of flexibility were made available.
In a SINTEF-study from 2010, Sæle & Grande
estimates the technical potential in Norwegian
households by analyzing results from a pilot by the
DSO Malvik Everk. The results from the pilot was an
estimated reduction in power output of 1 to 2,5 kWh/h
per end-user, depending on whether they were
equipped with hot water boilers or water based
residential heating systems respectively. By scaling
these results based on a 50% acceptance rate of
automated control of warm water tanks nationally, the
study concluded that the technical potential in these
Norwegian households amounted to 1000 MW.
Xrgia & EC Group (2012) estimated the technical
potential of end-user flexibility in the Norwegian
counties of Oslo and Akershus. Based on electricity
consumption statistics, estimates of future power
outtakes and qualitative assessments of end-user
flexibility deployment, an estimated technical potential
of 550 MW in Oslo and Akershus was found.
The technical potential of end-user flexibility will
also be influenced by a growing fleet of EV´s. In the
report “Does the electrical network have enough
capacity to include electrical buses, ferries and cars?”
from 2017, NVE estimates that each additional EV
represent an increase of 0.7 kW in peak demand. The
current fleet of roughly 125 000 EVs accounts for 100

MW in potential flexibility. This does not account for
the technical potential in charging appliances in the
Norwegian distribution network (Statistisk Sentralbyrå,
2017).
Even though the electricity systems in Norway and
Sweden are slightly different, both countries possess
long-term storage and flexibility solutions in
hydropower generation, and have integrated electricity
markets through Nord Pool. Comparing technical
potential between the two countries is thus a feasible
approach. In 2016, The Swedish Energy Market
Inspectorate (EI) conducted an extensive study of the
technical potential of end-user flexibility in Sweden.
The technical potential in Sweden was estimated to
almost 8000 MW in the winter months with 5500 MW
of this potential being supplied by residential endusers. In the summer months, the estimated flexibility
was 3700 MW, with 1700 MW being supplied by
residential end-users.
An earlier Swedish project, Elforsk, studied the
possibility of curtailing electric heating and water
heater loads. An average controllable load of 4-5 kW
per house at 10-15 degrees below zero implied a
technical potential of approximately 1500 MW in
Sweden (Elforsk, 2006).
Gaia Consulting (2011) estimated the practical
potential for end-user flexibility in the Nordic region.
The research highlighted that most of the flexibility
potential is in Swedish and Norwegian households,
with some flexibility available in Finnish households
and a very limited flexibility potential in Danish
households. The results relied heavily on economical,
technical and practical assumptions, but estimated the
end-user flexibility potential in the Nordic region to
between 4000 MW and 7000 MW, excluding
flexibility from the industry. From this potential
flexibility, between 1000 MW and 3500 MW
originated from Norwegian end-users.
In summary, several attempts of quantifying the
technical potential of end-user flexibility has been
conducted, both in Norway and abroad. However, it is
not clear from these research projects if this potential
stems from explicit- or implicit end-user flexibility. In
a report from 2016, COWI Belgium highlighted that
roughly 92% of potential peak reductions induced by
end-user flexibility deployment would come from
explicit end-user flexibility. The remaining 8% would
come from price based programs and implicit end-user
flexibility.

4.5. Dynamic Pricing, Tariffs and End-User
Flexibility.
Faruqui & Sergici (2010) review 15 different
Demand Response pilots in the U.S, Canada, Australia
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and France. All pilots target peak demand reductions
through dynamic electricity pricing. The review
conclude that ToU-rates induce a peak demand
reduction of 3 to 6%, while CPP-tariffing induce a
peak demand reduction of 13 to 20%. Faruqui and
Sergici highlight that by accounting for enabling
technologies, the CPP-tariffing leads to a peak demand
reduction of 27 to 44% due to different compensation
mechanisms.
Bartusch et al. (2011) analyze how end-users
respond to a demand based ToU-tariff. By utilizing this
indirect control contract, a Swedish DSO wanted to
investigate how they could reduce peak load in their
distribution network. The study concludes that endusers respond positively to being charged according to
this type of tariff. Furthermore, the introduction of the
tariff decreased the peak demand substantially.
In a later study, Bartusch et al. (2014) study the
effect of a power tariff on electricity consumption in a
residential area of Stockholm. The attitude to shift
consumption were measured over a long period, where
the researchers tested the attitude over six years. The
research concluded that although the attitude to shift
consumption from times of high demand of electricity
to times of low demand of electricity were significant,
it was not reflected through an actual shift in
consumption over time.
Haring & Andersson (2014) highlight the need for
incentive based rewarding contracts when pursuing
direct control flexibility mechanisms. Efficient
contracts between the prosumer and central agent must
be individually rational and incentive compatible. To
make contracts individually rational, the end-user must
be rewarded and not make a loss from entering the
flexibility contract. Incentive compatibility occurs
when the end-user receives incentives to display and
share their actual flexibility costs. By introducing a
non-linear framework of pricing, capacity reservation
and deployment of reserve energy are being rewarded
separately.
Another viable business model is proposed by
Campaigne and Oren (2016). By utilizing a fuse
control paradigm, flexibility aggregators impose
capacity constraints on prosumers or penalize them for
breaching a capacity threshold. Subsequently, the
prosumers allocate the available electricity to separate
devices. The contract between the flexibility
aggregator and the prosumer is seasonal, and typically
allow the aggregator to curtail consumption over time
given a certain probability of curtailment.

4.6. Trading End-User Flexibility in Flexibility
Markets.
Eid et al. (2016) discuss a flexibility market design
inspired by the French trading system and markets for
flexibility in both the short-, medium- and long-term
trading periods. In the French trading system,
minimum bid capacities for balancing services have
been reduced from 50 MW to 10 MW to motivate
smaller parties like independent aggregators to
participate in the balancing markets. The research is
based on five markets; ancillary services, system
balancing and network congestion management, spot
markets and generation capacity markets.
Zhang et al. (2014) introduces a clearinghouse
concept for flexibility called FLECH at the distribution
level. The FLECH market utilizes aggregator-based
offers to promote small scale DERs with up to 5MW
for their active market participation. In this market
design, the compensation is stipulated by the capacity
needs of the DSO. The aggregator then responds to this
capacity need by bidding prices and quantities of
flexibility, and the FLECH market runs single-side
auctions or super market trading where the aggregator
designs specific flexibility products that are presented
to the end-users.
A third, bid-less flexibility market design is
presented by Gantenbein et al. (2012). By updating and
publishing prices in five-minute intervals, customers
can respond to this price continuously by shifting their
load (Larsen, et al., 2015).
ENFO (2016) discuss a “traffic light regulation” of
monopoly and market functions in the electricity
system, which was first proposed by Eurelectric (2014)
in their report “Active Distribution System
Management”. This system is based on the need for
specific option schemes for Norwegian DSO´s.
Separating monopoly- and market activities makes it
possible to introduce new products that enables the
end-user to participate in the market.

5. Case study
The case study is provided by Skagerak Nett, a
DSO in southern Norway, and it illustrates how enduser flexibility can be used to defer investments, in this
particular case, in upgrading the capacity of two
transformers in a substation. The increased capacity is
necessary both to handle peak load and to provide
reserve in case of component malfunction.
The DSO considers two different Scenarios
concerning the use of flexibility. In scenario 1, enduser flexibility is used only in case of malfunction in
the transformers. In the second scenario, end-user
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flexibility is used in case of malfunctions as well as to
handle peak loads in normal operations. The scenarios
represent two possible applications that the industry
considers valuable and feasible, and both may help to
defer capacity-increasing investments.
Another dimension studied by the DSO is the
sources of flexibility, i.e. who will provide the
flexibility services to the DSO. In the following, F1
includes industrial consumers that are already flexible
to the TSO, while F2 also includes a tentative
flexibility from households, assuming that 1/3 of the
households in the area will provide 1 and 1.5 kW in
off-peak and peak hours respectively.
Three different load increase predictions are
considered: a 34 % increase in load until 2040, as well
as a 16 % increase and 0 % increase.
Load increases and component malfunctions have
traditionally been resolved by direct investments in
capacity increasing assets and reserves, and end-user
flexibility is presented as an alternative technology.
We discuss four alternatives or cases, one traditional
investment case, which serves as the base case, and
three cases with different compensation schemes for
end-user flexibility:
1. Investing in capacity increase without any use of
end-user flexibility.
2. Compensating
flexible
end-users
through
discounted network tariffs.
3. Compensating flexible end-users through an
availability payment of 20,000 NOK per MWh
and an activation payment of 20,000 NOK per
MWh.
4. Compensating flexible end-users through an
activation payment of 30,000 NOK per MWh.
In order to evaluate the effect on cost, the DSO has
used historical data on load, probability of failures, and
different cost elements. The compensation levels in the
flexibility mechanisms are high, but lower than the
value of lost load. If too high, the cost of the flexibility
mechanisms will be overestimated.
The alternatives given by the four cases above,
have different effects on different cost groups (ref.
section 2.3). In the first case, the investment expense
will increase CAPEX immediately, while this increase
is delayed for the other cases. The DSO invests in the
capacity upgrade in all four cases, however at different
points in time, given by when the N-1 criterion is no
longer met. The OPEX will be higher in cases 2-4, due
to switching and repair cost, but also due to the
flexibility payment. These costs are however lower in
case 2, since the tariff discounts to flexible consumers
will be compensated by higher tariffs to non-flexible
consumers (the incentive regulation fixes the total
revenue for each company, and the company collects
the revenue by two-part tariffs). VOLL and network

losses are similar, but these costs, especially losses, are
particularly high if the load increase is high. Table 1
summarizes the present value of cost changes over the
investment cycle (i.e. until 2040) in different
situations.
Table 1. PV of cost.

Case
1
2
3
4

Scenario 1

Scenario 2

Load Increase Prediction

Load Increase Prediction

Flexible
volume
-

34 %

16 %

0%

34 %

16 %

0%

100 %

100 %

100 %

100 %

100 %

100 %

F1
F2

93 %
90 %

42 %
41 %

16 %
16 %

87 %
81 %

16 %
13 %

5%
7%

F1

97 %

63 %

37 %

94 %

61 %

59 %

F2

98 %

70 %

45 %

105 %

101 %

70 %

F1

93 %

42 %

16 %

91 %

52 %

55 %

F2

90 %

41 %

17 %

106 %

103 %

59 %

Table 1 shows normalized cost figures (the lower
number, the better), with the investment case as the
base case (100 %). In the flexible load cases,
investments are deferred by 3-4 years with the high
load increase, and by 22 years otherwise. We also note
that flexibility is better with lower load increases and if
more suppliers can provide flexibility. Moreover, the
costs are lower if flexibility is provided by tariff
reductions, particularly in the situations where
flexibility is much used, i.e. with 16 % or 0 % load
increase. This is due to the incentive regulation model,
where it is advantageous for the company to avoid
cost, since increasing the cost may reduce efficiency
scores and costs are not fully compensated in the
yardstick model (ref. section 2.3). This illustrates that
the vertical separation, that was the starting point of the
Norwegian deregulation, is not so straightforward, and
that local flexibility markets can influence and interact
with the regulation model in unexpected ways. In this
case, the compensation mechanism is not neutral under
the regulation model, and this may favor some ways of
solving a problem at the expense of others.
To understand the full effect on the companies'
incomes, we should also calculate the revenue caps.
However, these are even more difficult to forecast,
since in order to do so, we need to estimate the effects
not only on cost, but also on the benchmarking results.
This involves estimating the outputs too, and in general
what happens to other companies in the industry over
several decades. An example for the high load increase
is given in table 2, where changes in revenue are
normalized relative to case 1.
From Table 2 we notice that cases 2 and 4 are
similar in Scenario 1. This is because flexibility is little
used when the load increase is high. Then the
flexibility mechanism with high activation payment is
better than the one with both activation and availability
payment (case 3). The choice of compensation method
may affect revenues positively or negatively, since the
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larger cost of direct payments for flexibility services on
the one hand increases cost and on the other hand
decreases efficiency, and thus possibly the cost norm.
Table 2. PV of revenue caps.

[3] Bartusch, C., F. Wallin, M. Odlare, I. Vassileva, and L.
Wester, “Introducing a demand-based electricity distribution
tariff in the residential sector: Demand response and
customer perception”, Energy Policy, 2011.
[4] Bjørndal, E., M. Bjørndal, P. Pardalos, and M. Rönnqvist,
Energy, Natural Resources and Environmental Economics.
New York, Springer, 2010.
[5] Bogetoft, P., and L. Otto, Benchmarking with DEA, SFA
and R, New York, Springer, 2011.
[6] Bozchalui, M., S. Hashmi, H. Hassen, and C. Canizares,
Optimal Operation of Residential Energy Hubs, IEEE, 2012.

The most profitable situation occurs when end-user
flexibility allows investments to be deferred, and this
flexibility can be invoked by tariff redistributions.

6. Conclusions
End-user flexibility, together with distributed
generation and storage, may provide alternatives to
investing and reinvesting in grid capacity in the local
networks. From the presented case study, we notice
that the choice of compensation method to customers
have a large impact on the profitability of the network
companies. By issuing direct payments for flexibility
services, end-user flexibility may result in a higher
revenue cap although efficiency is lower, while
redistribution of network tariffs have only a marginal
effect on changes in efficiency and revenue cap. Thus,
using end-user flexibility to defer network investments
is likely to come with a redistribution of regulated
network tariffs rather than development of local
flexibility markets. This highlights some of the future
challenges that the regulator faces in setting a
regulatory framework for end-user flexibility, and it
challenges the vertical separation that has been a
corner stone in the deregulated electricity market.
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